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Abstract 
We report the first real world implementation of a Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) system over a 
43dB-loss transmission line in the Swisscom fibre optic network. The QKD system is capable of 
continuous and autonomous operation and uses the coherent one-way (COW) protocol. This system 
brings together three key concepts for future QKD systems: a simple high-speed protocol; high 
performance detection; and integration, both at the component level as well for connectivity with 
standard fibre networks. Here, we show laboratory and field trial results for this system. The full 
prototype version uses InGaAs/InP avalanche photodiodes (APDs) and was laboratory tested up to 
150km, with a 10-hour exchange averaging around 2kbps of real-time distilled secret bits over 
100km. In the field trials, we obtained average distribution rates, during 3 hours, of 2.5bps over a 
43dB-loss line of 150km, when using superconducting single photon detectors (SSPDs). 
 
Introduction 
Quantum Key Distribution (QKD) provides a means of generating secret random bit strings, keys, 
at two distant locations, such that their secrecy is guaranteed by the laws of quantum physics1. 
Invented in 1984, QKD witnessed a rapid development during the 1990s culminating in the first 
commercial prototypes a few years ago2. Since then efforts have focused on three crucial aspects: 
improved components; better protocols; and more generally, system integration, for continuous 
operation in real world networks. The first targets increasing maximum transmission range and bit 
rates using e.g. high performance superconducting detectors3. The second has resulted in the 
development of new schemes that render faint laser systems less vulnerable against photon number 
splitting attacks4,5,6,7,8. Finally, the continuous operation, standardisation and the development of 
secure networks and network protocols9,10 will be necessary for eventual commercial success. The 
goal of our work has been to combine these three lines of research.  
The performance of a QKD system can be described by the secret bit rate K = Rr, where R 
is the sifted bit rate and r denotes the secret key fraction11. In principle, R is proportional to the 
pulse rate of the source νs and the average number of photons per pulse µ. Increasing the rate (or µ) 
is a straightforward way to increase R. Pulse rates of more than 1GHz12,13,14 and even up to 10GHz, 
though only over a fraction of a second3, have already been demonstrated by some groups. 
However, r depends on the potential information of an eavesdropper and in the case of faint laser 
systems, which are vulnerable to photon number splitting (PNS) attacks, depends on µ. The 
implementation of faint laser schemes, like “Differential Phase Shift” (DPS)4 or SARG5, or decoy 
states15, which are resistant against PNS attacks, allows one to increase µ and therefore, the 
maximum distance and secret bit rate. Finally, the quantum bit error rate (QBER) is dependent on 
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the ratio between the detector noise and transmission loss. Therefore the detector noise limits the 
maximum transmission distance, hence the interest in low noise superconducting detectors3,16. 
We have developed a QKD prototype based on a PNS-attack resistant protocol called 
coherent one-way7 (COW) that takes advantage of high pulse rates, continuous and automated 
operation, and free-running, low noise, detectors. We report on laboratory tests up to 31dB 
(>150km of standard fibre), with a 10-hour exchange averaging around 2kbps over 21dB (100km) 
using InGaAs/InP avalanche photodiodes (APDs). We also performed a field trial, over the 
Swisscom fibre optic network between Geneva and Neuchâtel, a physical distance of 110km with a 
fibre transmission distance of 150km in a high loss (43dB) line, corresponding to over 200km of 
standard fibre. Using superconducting single photon detectors (SSPDs), we found average 
distribution rates of 2.5bps with a fully autonomous QKD system. 
The Coherent One-Way QKD Protocol 
In the COW QKD protocol, logical bits are encoded in time7. A sequence of weak coherent pulses 
is tailored from a CW-laser with an external intensity modulator (see Figure 1). The emitter, Alice, 
encodes using time slots (separated by T) containing either 0-pulses, no light, or µ-pulses, with a 
mean number of photons of µ<1. The logical bit 0L (1L) corresponds to a sequence 0-µ (µ-0). For 
security reason, we also send µ-µ decoy sequences. The receiver, Bob, registers the time-of-arrival 
of the photons on detectors DB for the data line and DM for the monitoring line. The DB times give 
the raw key from which Alice and Bob extract the net key. The security is guaranteed by checking 
for detections on DM, for decoy sequences and logical sequences 1L0L, at random times using an 
unbalanced interferometer that has a path-length difference of T. The interferometer is only used to 
estimate the information of the eavesdropper and cannot introduce errors on the key.  
 
Figure 1 Coherent one-way protocol. A schematic of the setup is shown (bottom left) with a 
photograph (above) of the final 19” rack-mountable system. On the right we see a satellite image 
showing the two cities used for this QKD field trial. 
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Security 
Proving the security of the COW protocol remains a work in progress. The standard methods for 
proving the security of QKD protocols were, so far, developed for protocols in which the quantum 
symbols are sent one-by-one (e.g., qubits in the BB8417, B9218, SARG5 protocols). The COW 
protocol, however, does not use this symbol-per-symbol type of coding and the standard security 
proofs do not apply in any straightforward way. To the contrary, the COW protocol is a so-called 
distributed-phase-reference protocol, like DPS, which relies on the coherence between successive 
non-empty pulses to ensure the security of the protocol. So far, the security of the COW protocol 
has been proven against the Beam-Splitting Attack (BSA)7,8,19,20 and some intercept-resend 
attacks7,19 and against arbitrary collective attacks, under the assumption that Bob receives at most 
one photon per pulse. Here we use an estimate on Eve’s information: 
€ 
IAE (µ) = µ 1− t( ) + 1−V( )
1+ e−µt
2e−µt , 
where the first term corresponds to BSAs and the second to intercept-resend attacks. t is the line 
transmission and V, the interferometer’s visibility. From this we can also determine an upper bound 
on the secret key rate:  
€ 
K = R(µ,ν s) 1− h(Q(µ))− IAE (µ)[ ]. 
The second term corresponds to the secret key fraction r. h(Q(µ)) is the Shannon entropy, for a 
given QBER, that is related to the minimum fraction of bits lost due to error correction (EC).  
Description of the prototype 
The system has been developed to be rack mountable in two 19 inches boxes. Two fibres link them 
together; the first used for the quantum channel, the second for the classical communication, 
synchronisation and pre-sifting, which we explain momentarily. Each box is connected to the 
Internet for the classical processing of the raw key. Alice and Bob have similar structures: optical 
and electronics modules with Field Programmable Gate Arrays (FPGAs) and embedded computers. 
The optical modules are very simple (see Figure 1). Alice’s optics consists of a CW DFB 
telecom laser diode at 1550nm (Thorlabs, 1554.94-20) and a Lithium niobate intensity modulator 
(Avanex, 10Gbits/s) to tailor the sequence of pulses. After the intensity modulator a 50/50 coupler 
splits the beam in two where a PIN InGaAs detector monitors the power so as to set the variable 
attenuator (OZ Optics, DD-600-xx) to the appropriate mean number µ = 0.5 photons per pulse, 
independent of fibre length. On Bob’s side, a 90/10 coupler sends 90% of the photons directly to a 
single photon detector DB (bit or data channel). The remaining 10% of the photons go through an 
unbalanced Michelson interferometer and are detected by DM (monitor channel). The interferometer 
is passively temperature stabilised.  
Alice and Bob’s units use embedded computers to monitor and control the full system. Each 
computer has several tasks: one process supervises all the subsystems and the communication 
between Alice and Bob; and a second, controls various regulation tasks, e.g. for Alice, the current 
of the DFB laser. Another processor is used to handle communication between the embedded 
computer and FPGA. The optical system is driven at a rate of 625MHz with a subsequent logical bit 
rate of 312.5Mb/s. The outgoing signal of the FPGA is shaped via a homemade ECL electronic 
circuit and driver amplifier (Picosecond, 5865, 12.5Gb/s) producing 300ps optical pulse widths. A 
synchronisation and pre-sifting (from Bob to Alice) signals are combined using a WDM and sent 
through the second (classical) optical channel. 
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A Quantum Random Number Generator (QRNG) (id Quantique, Quantis OEM module) 
produces random bits at a rate of 4Mbits/s. However, logical bits, at a rate of 312.5Mb/s have to be 
generated. We use the output of this QRNG to frequently seed a pseudo-random number generator 
(PRNG) implemented inside the FPGA. This PRNG is made of a 32-bit Linear Feedback Shift 
Register (LFSR) and produces pseudo random sequences of (232 - 1) bits, a period of around 13s. In 
our system, the QRNG supplies a new seed to the PRNG every 64µs thus avoiding sequence 
repetitions. This solution allows us to obtain the 312.5Mb/s rate demanded by our system. Decoy 
sequences are sent whenever the 1010 string is found at the output of the random generator. The 
generation of quantum random bits at GHz rates is currently an open problem. n.b. The COW 
protocol only requires a RNG on Alice’s side. 
On Bob’s side, InGaAs APDs are Peltier cooled to around -50°C and provide a simple, 
reliable and cheap detection system. Normally, these detectors are used in a so-called gated mode 
but in our case we use them in the recently developed free running mode21. We obtain dark count 
rates and quantum efficiencies of the order of 10-6 per ns and 10%, respectively. To limit the after-
pulse probabilities to below 10-5 per ns, dead times of the order of 30µs have been applied that 
limits the maximal detection rate to ~30kHz, which is not a problem for longer distances, but a 
limiting factor at short distances. At short distances up-conversion based detection schemes, with 
detection rates up to 10MHz12, could provide an interesting alternative. For the long distance 
experiments we use SSPDs, because of their low noise capabilities22. The sub-4K operating 
temperature is certainly a handicap for a commercial system, however, the system is a fibre coupled 
SSPD in a cryogen free cryostat, developed within the European project Sinphonia23, which makes 
their application rather straightforward in a laboratory environment. These detectors have quantum 
efficiencies up to 2.5% with noise levels less than 10 counts per second that can be adjusted via a 
bias current. Currently though, their dependence on polarisation, which can reduce the quantum 
efficiency by 50%, is problematic for fibre transmission.  
Prototype operation 
Before the operation of any QKD system an installation procedure must be undertaken that 
includes, checking component operation, such as the efficiency of detectors and the optimum 
parameters for the intensity modulator as well as network characteristics like the total attenuation of 
the fibre transmission line. However, from this point, all the initialisation and synchronisation for 
the exchange is performed automatically by the COW system. In particular, the following steps are 
carried out:  
a) Identification of bit numbers: Alice sends a series of different pulse patterns over the 
synchronisation channel, during initialisation, so that Bob can identify the pulse numbers, i.e. the 
length difference between the classical and quantum fibres. 
b) A fine temporal tuning of the detection window. The delay, between synchronisation and 
the detector output pulses, is scanned to maximise the count rates, which also reduces noise and 
crosstalk between adjacent pulses. 
c) Wavelength adjustment and interference visibility. Random pulse sequences are sent over 
the quantum channel, the wavelength of the laser is scanned and the count-rate on monitoring 
detector recorded. The resulting interference fringe is used to calculate the visibility and set the 
wavelength for destructive interference. 
Figure 2 shows an example of the data on the monitoring line. On the left hand side we see the 
noise rate and then the rate during a scan of the laser wavelength when random pulse sequences are 
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sent. The maximum and minimum levels 
are then determined and if the minimum 
level is sufficiently close to the noise 
level, say a visibility >97%, then the key 
exchange is started. The laser wavelength 
is continuously tuned in order to 
minimise the monitoring count rate and 
keep it above 95%. If for some reason the 
visibility drops below this limit, a 
complete scan is automatically performed 
again and the key exchange restarts.  
To perform the key exchange Alice 
randomly sends bits encoding 0L, 1L and 
decoy sequences. Bob registers all 
detection times for the data and the 
monitoring detector. He then announces 
for which bit there was a detection on DB, 
as well as the times when he got clicks on 
the monitoring detector, DM. In order to save memory space, Alice uses this pre-sifting information 
to immediately delete the bit values that are not needed. She then checks the security using the 
relevant monitoring detections, i.e. detections that correspond to interfering pulses. If the associated 
visibility is over 95%, the key exchange continues. Alice then tells Bob, which detections, 
corresponding to decoy sequences, have to be removed from his data. Thus, Alice and Bob finally 
have a shared stream of bits, the sifted 
key. 
The distillation software then 
corrects the errors in the sifted key and 
applies the privacy amplification 
algorithm. The error correction is based 
on the Cascade algorithm24. As the bit 
exchange is continuous, the distillation 
software has to run in parallel, in real 
time, and treats blocks of data, 213 or 214 
bits, depending on the distance, so as to 
ensure a good efficiency. Eve’s 
information is removed through privacy 
amplification implemented using hashing 
functions based on Toeplitz matrices25. 
Finally, all information exchanges over 
the classical channel during the 
distillation procedure are securely 
authenticated using a Wegman-Carter 
type scheme, implementing universal 
hashing functions26. 
 
 
Figure 2 Monitoring line. Alice’s laser wavelength 
(current) is periodically scanned to optimise the 
visibility of Bob’s monitoring interferometer.  
 
Figure 3 Secret bit rate and QBER vs Time. A 
10-hour key exchange with 25km of fibre plus 15dB 
attenuation, equivalent to around 100km of standard 
fibre. We show the rate averaged over 10 minute 
intervals. The drops in rate denote periods of auto 
re-alignment when key generation is interrupted. 
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Results 
We have performed a series of measurement in the lab using InGaAs detectors. We introduced 
25km of fibres and a variable attenuator between Alice and Bob and we started all key exchanges 
with the complete initialisation and synchronisation procedure. In Figure 3 we can see the results of 
a key exchange with 21dB loss, corresponding to >100km of standard fibre. We find a bit rate mean 
secret bit rate of around 2kbps, after the distillation and authentication process. This figure 
illustrates the system’s capability for continuous operation and its ability to automatically recover 
when the QBER increases excessively.  
In Figure 4 we present the results obtained with 25km of fibre (around 6dB) with additional loss 
from an attenuator. Each point of the graph gives the mean secret bit rate and the QBER obtained 
over one hour. The rate is the direct 
output from the distillation software, it is 
not an evaluation based on the raw 
detection rate, the QBER and the 
visibility of the interferometer. For short 
distances and low losses, the rate is 
limited by detector saturation, leading to 
the almost constant rate up to 21dB. 
Nonetheless, we are able to distribute > 
50bps over a 31dB-loss line. Note, at 6dB 
we see a sharp increase in the QBER that 
is due to charge persistence in the 
detectors. Due to the high photon flux, 
there is an increased probability that a 
photon arriving before the detector is 
“on” provokes a detection avalanche. This 
leads to additional errors and an increase 
in QBER. 
Field Measurements 
We have also performed field measurements using a fibre link between our lab in Geneva and a lab 
of our colleagues at the University of Neuchâtel using the Swisscom fibre network. While Alice 
travelled to Neuchâtel, we connected Bob to SSPD detectors situated in the Geneva lab. Neuchâtel 
is some 110km beeline from Geneva, the fibre, however, had a length of about 150km and rather 
high loss of 43dB, due to many connections in between.  
In Figure 5a we show the data for an exchange over 3.5 hours, featuring an average secret 
bit rate of roughly 2.5 bits per second with a reasonable QBER of about 5%. At this long distance, 
the count rates on the monitoring line become very small (< 1 per 10s) and the statistics aren’t 
sufficient to correctly establish the value of the visibility and continuously adjust the laser 
wavelength. Therefore, while this is probably the longest key exchange ever, its security is 
questionable.  
We finally used the same installed 150km fibre and mimicked key exchanges over intermediate 
distances by increasing the pulse energy of the outgoing pulses at Alice. The results are summarised 
in Figure 5b, where you can see the secret key rate as a function of fibre loss. We see some 
fluctuations about the theoretical value that is in part due to detector efficiency’s sensitivity to 
polarisation. At shorter distances < 20dB the rate is again saturated, although here, it is due to the 
Figure 4 Secret bit rate and QBER vs Distance. 
Rates and errors as a function of the loss, or 
distance. 31dB corresponds to ~150km of standard 
fibre. 
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EC and the classical communication time between Alice and Bob who are still separated by 150km 
of fibre in this case. It turns out, that for longer distances, lower detector efficiencies, and hence 
lower noise, can lead to improved overall rates. To see this, we lowered the bias current on the 
detectors and found the resulting (circled) distribution rates of 2.5bps at 42-43dB, i.e. over 200km 
of standard fibre loss.  
 
Figure 5 Long distance QKD. a) Continuous operation over 3.5 hours for a 43dB-loss line. b) 
Rates and errors as a function of loss in the installed, Geneva-Neuchâtel, fibre. 
Conclusion 
We have presented results for a prototype QKD system in a real world implementation of QKD 
over distances corresponding to 43dB in the Swisscom fibre optic network between the cities of 
Geneva and Neuchâtel. The QKD system has integrated optics, electronics and software that allows 
for continuous and autonomous operation. We have used the coherent one-way (COW) protocol, 
which is a protocol that was invented with this specific goal in mind. Here, we have shown 
laboratory and field trial results for this system. The full prototype version uses InGaAs/InP 
avalanche photodiodes (APDs) and was laboratory tested up to 31dB (~150km), with a 10-hour 
exchange averaging secret bit rates over 2kbps for 21dB. In the field trials, with superconducting 
single photon detectors, we find average bit rates of 2.5bps for 43dB. The results presented here are 
a major step forward towards inter-city QKD for future quantum networks. 
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